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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of case The cases under review here allege tragic facts 
involving sex trafficking. But this mandamus petition 
involves only questions of law. Plaintiffs Jane Doe 1 
and Jane Doe 2 have alleged that their traffickers 
contacted them through Facebook and Instagram, 
luring them into trafficking by promising a better life 
(MR028, MR288-89). Plaintiffs bring state-law claims 
against Facebook for negligence, gross negligence, 
violations of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 
§ 98.002, and products liability (MR050-54, MR313-
17).   
Facebook moved to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims 
under Rule 91a based on 47 U.S.C. § 230, which 
provides immunity to interactive computer services 
from claims that attempt to hold them responsible for 
content posted by third parties, and expressly 
preempts state-law causes of action that would do 
otherwise (MR071-088, MR331-48). Facebook cited 
unanimous Texas case law holding that state-law 
claims like those asserted here do not survive Section 
230’s immunity and preemption provisions (id.). 
Trial court Both cases were before the 334th District Court, the 
Hon. Steven Kirkland presiding, who denied the 91a 
motions after a joint oral hearing (MR204-06, MR464-
66, MR518-81) and subsequently denied 
reconsideration (MR243, MR503) and permission to 
appeal (MR257, MR517). 
xiv
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Federal law grants online services like Facebook, Inc. immunity 
from claims arising out of content generated by third parties, and 
preempts all state laws or claims to the contrary. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. The 
trial court denied Facebook’s motions to dismiss the underlying suits 
asserting such state law claims. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. Denial of a Rule 
91a motion to dismiss is reviewable by mandamus. See In re Houston 
Specialty Ins. Co., 569 S.W.3d 138 (Tex. 2019). This Court has jurisdiction 
to issue a writ of mandamus to correct the trial court’s error. See TEX.
GOV’T CODE § 22.221(b)(1). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court misapply the law, and thus abuse its discretion, 
by denying Relator’s Rule 91a motions to dismiss, because 47 
U.S.C. § 230 prohibits and preempts all of Plaintiffs’ claims? 
2. Is a final appeal after plenary trial an inadequate remedy for the 
error, because 47 U.S.C. § 230 provides for immunity from suit 
that would be defeated by delaying review until after trial? 
1
INTRODUCTION 
The claims here asserted against Facebook have no basis in law. 
Even when a plaintiff’s injuries are tragic, the rule of law does not allow 
imposing damages on a defendant based on claims that have no basis 
in law. And when the law prescribes immunity from suit, the courts 
cannot require a defendant to suffer through months of litigation and a 
plenary trial before that immunity is respected. 
Federal law grants interactive computer services immunity for 
claims arising out of content generated by third parties. See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230. State rules require that trial courts dismiss lawsuits barred by 
such laws. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. The trial court refused to do so here, 
and that error is reviewable by mandamus. See In re Houston Specialty 
Ins. Co., 569 S.W.3d 138 (Tex. 2019). This Court should review and 
reverse. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Jane Doe 1 
The following facts are taken entirely from the Third Amended 
Petition of Jane Doe 1 in Cause No. 2018-69816 (MR001-070). See TEX. R.
2
CIV. P. 91a. These are the only facts alleged about what happened to her; 
the remainder of her 69-page petition consists of allegations about 
Facebook’s overall business, allegations against other defendants, and 
discussion of the evils of sex trafficking generally.  
In 2012, when Jane Doe 1 was 15 years old, she accepted a “friend” 
request from a stranger with whom she shared several Facebook 
friends, and after accepting his friend request, exchanged messages 
with him on Facebook (MR028 ¶¶224‒25). This adult, whose name does 
not appear in the petition (MR029 ¶241 n.24), told her she was “pretty 
enough to be a model,” made false promises of financial security and a 
better life through modeling, and ultimately invited her to meet him off-
line (MR028 ¶¶227, 232). The petition alleges that she agreed to meet 
with him in person and that within hours of doing so she was raped, 
beaten, and forced into sex trafficking (MR029 ¶235). She alleges that 
she was later “instructed by her trafficker to meet child molesters” at a 
hotel in Houston (MR004 ¶29, MR050 ¶¶305‒06). 
3
Plaintiff Jane Doe 2 
The following facts are taken entirely from the Second Amended 
Petition of Jane Doe 2 in Cause No. 2018-82214 (MR258-330). See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 91a. Again, these are the only facts alleged about what happened 
to her; the remainder of the 72-page petition focuses on allegations 
against other defendants and discussion of sex trafficking and social 
media use generally. 
In 2017, when Jane Doe 2 was 14 years old, she became a “friend” 
with an adult on Instagram who provided “false promises of love and 
a better future” to lure her into sex trafficking (MR287 ¶¶237‒39). She 
does not disclose the name or number of her trafficker(s).1 She alleges 
that, through Instagram, they posted her for sale, arranged dates, and 
posted partially nude photographs of her (MR289 ¶¶242-43), and in 2018 
she was instructed to meet child molesters at a hotel in Houston, where 
she was exploited (MR312 ¶315). After she was rescued from trafficking, 
1 It is difficult to tell how many perpetrators were involved, because Plaintiff 
references a “trafficker” (MR288 ¶237, MR312 ¶¶315-16) and “traffickers” (MR289
¶¶242, 243, 245) alternately in her petition. 
4
she alleges that her traffickers continued using her profile to traffic 
others (MR289 ¶245).
Trial court proceedings 
On March 27, 2019, Facebook filed parallel motions to dismiss 
each case under Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (MR071-
088, MR331-48). As set forth below, federal law grants Facebook 
immunity from claims that treat it as a publisher of content generated 
by third parties. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. Citing that law, Facebook argued 
that neither case had any basis in law. 
The 91a motions were expressly made subject to previous special 
appearances filed contesting personal jurisdiction in each case (MR076,
MR336). The Texas rules allow a party to proceed on a 91a motion 
without waiving a special appearance. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.8. Since 91a 
motions address only the Plaintiffs’ pleadings and require neither 
discovery nor evidence, id. at 91a.6, Facebook opted to proceed first on 
the 91a motions and hold the special appearances in abeyance.  
On May 3, 2019, the 334th District Court, the Hon. Steven 
Kirkland presiding, conducted an oral hearing on both 91a motions 
5
(MR518-80). Both parties filed further briefing after the hearing, and on 
May 23, 2019, Judge Kirkland signed orders denying both motions 
(MR204-06, MR464-66).  
Facebook responded with two motions on August 1, 2019 (after 
previously scheduled attorney vacations): a motion for reconsideration 
of the 91a motions (MR207-22, MR467-82), and an alternative motion 
requesting a permissive interlocutory appeal on this controlling 
question of law (MR223-36, MR483-96). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 51.014(d). Per the trial court’s procedures, the motion for 
reconsideration was set for submission on September 16, 2019, and the 
trial court denied it that same day (MR243, MR503).   
The first available oral hearing in the trial court for the permissive 
appeal motions was on September 20th, and to avoid further delay and 
unnecessary or piecemeal appeals, Facebook set both those motions and 
its special appearances for that date. Tropical Storm Imelda intervened, 
forcing the trial court to postpone the hearing to Friday, October 4, 2019. 
Three days after the hearing, the trial court denied both the motions for 
6
permissive interlocutory appeal and the special appearances (MR257, 
MR517).  
This petition for mandamus challenges the denial of the 91a 
motions, as provided by Texas law. See In re Houston Specialty Ins. Co., 
569 S.W.3d 138, 142 (Tex. 2019) (conditionally granting mandamus relief 
for failure to grant Rule 91a dismissal); In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 
524, 528 (Tex. 2014) (same). By notices of interlocutory appeal filed 
concurrently with this petition, Facebook has also challenged the denial 
of the special appearances. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 51.014(a)(7). 
ARGUMENT 
Mandamus relief is appropriate to correct a trial court order 
(1) that reflects a clear abuse of discretion, (2) for which the relator has 
no adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Geomet Recycling LLC, 578 
S.W.3d 82, 91 (Tex. 2019). The order here meets both requirements: the 
trial court failed to dismiss these cases despite federal law granting 
Facebook immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims (part I below), and 
postponing review until a post-trial final judgment is not an adequate 
7
remedy for immunity from suit (part II below).  
I. Abuse of Discretion: Section 230 Bars Plaintiffs’ Claims 
“A trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is 
or applying the law to the facts.” In re Geomet, 578 S.W.3d at 91 (quoting 
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)). Thus, a trial court 
abuses its discretion if it fails to analyze or apply the law correctly. See 
id.; In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tex. 2018). 
A. 47 U.S.C. § 230 grants immunity from suits that arise 
from content generated by third parties 
Congress enacted and President Clinton signed the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 “to promote competition and reduce 
regulation” and “encourage the rapid deployment of new 
telecommunications technologies.” See Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56 
(1996). The Act was the first major overhaul of telecommunications law 
in over 60 years,2 and established a federal policy “to promote the 
2 See https://www.fcc.gov/general/telecommunications-act-1996.  
8
continued development of the Internet” as a “vibrant and competitive 
free market … unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”3
The Act adopted 47 U.S.C. § 230, a provision that grants immunity4
to interactive computer services from claims that treat them as 
publishers of content generated by third parties:5
This rule of federal immunity applies to search engines like Google and 
Yahoo!,6 social networking sites like Facebook, Instagram, MySpace, 
3 Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 63 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(b)(1)-(2)); Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (same); 
GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 759 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. 
denied) (same). 
4 Section 230 contains some exceptions to this blanket immunity, such as for 
copyright infringement claims. However, such exceptions are inapplicable here. 
5 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
6 See, e.g., Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102‒03 (9th Cir. 2009). 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider. 
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and Twitter,7 and e-commerce sites like Amazon and Orbitz.8
To ensure this federal law is not frustrated by state or local laws, 
Section 230 expressly preempts and precludes all state or local causes of 
action providing otherwise:9
B. All Texas cases on § 230 recognize this immunity  
Westlaw® reports almost 500 cases citing Section 230’s immunity 
or preemption clauses (§§ 230(c)(1), 230(e)(3)): 418 federal cases and 81 
state cases. No brief can address all of them. But of the 19 cases from 
state appellate and federal courts in Texas (one from the Fifth Circuit, 
15 from U.S. district courts, and three from state appellate courts), not 
7 See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d at 68; Franklin v. X Gear 101, LLC, No. 
17 Civ. 6542 (GBD) (GWG), 2018 WL 4103492, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2018) 
(Instagram); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008); Crosby v. Twitter, 
Inc., 921 F.3d 617, 627 n.7 (6th Cir. 2019). 
8 See, e.g., Kabbaj v. Google Inc., 592 F. App’x 74 (3d Cir. 2015) (Amazon); 
Milgram v. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., 16 A.3d 1113, 1127 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2010). 
9 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). 
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed 
under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section. 
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one holds that a state law claim based on third-party content survives 
Section 230’s immunity and preemption provisions.10 This Court would 
be the first to do so by denying Facebook’s petition here. Doing so 
would also place this Court in direct conflict with courts across the 
United States that have found interactive computer service companies 
10 See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 420; Takhvar v. Page, No. 2:17-CV-00673-
JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 4677808, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 4677799 
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2018); Inge v. Walker, No. 3:16-CV-0042-B, 2017 WL 4838981, at *4 
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2017); La’Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 981, 995 (S.D. 
Tex. 2017); Wiswell v. VerticalScope, Inc., No. A-11-CA-737-SS, 2012 WL 13136295, at 
*5 n.7 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2012); Int’l Cotton Mktg., Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., No. 
5:08-CV-159-C ECF, 2009 WL 10705346, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 15, 2009); Doe v. 
MySpace, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 663, 664-65 (E.D. Tex. May 22, 2009); GW Equity LLC 
v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. 3:07-CV-976-0, 2009 WL 62173, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 
2009); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849-50 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 528 
F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008); Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at 
**4-5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006); Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 652 (E.D. 
Tex. Mar. 30, 2006); Cisneros v. Sanchez, 403 F. Supp. 2d 588, 593 (S.D. Tex. 2005) 
(holding Section 230 inapplicable to immunize defendant’s own statements); MCW, 
Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 WL 833595, at 
*10 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004) (same); Davis v. Motiva Enters., L.L.C., No. 09-14-00434-
CV, 2015 WL 1535694, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 2, 2015, pet. denied) 
(affirming 91a dismissal based on Section 230); GoDaddy.com, LLC, 429 S.W.3d at 
760-61; Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210, 215-16 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.). 
Some of the Texas cases address procedural issues rather than the merits. See, e.g., 
A.R.K. v. La Petite Acad., No. SA-18-CV-294-XR, 2018 WL 2059531, at **2-3 (W.D. Tex. 
May 2, 2018) (holding federal defenses like Section 230 are insufficient for removal 
as federal question); R.L. Lackner, Inc. v. Sanchez, No. Civ.A.B-05-264, 2005 WL 
3359356, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2005) (same); Edwards v. Wyatt, No. A-07-CA-1008 
RP, 2009 WL 10669430, at **6-7 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2009) (holding Section 230 defense 
waived because untimely raised). 
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immune from state claims based on a third party’s online drug 
trafficking,11 online arms trafficking,12 and online sex trafficking.13
Section 230 does not bar all lawsuits against internet companies; 
only claims that “treat” them as “the publisher or speaker” of content 
generated by third parties. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). As the Fourth Circuit 
concluded over twenty years ago, this means that claims against an 
internet company for exercising “a publisher’s traditional editorial 
functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or 
alter content—are barred.”14 Over 150 cases have cited the Fourth 
Circuit’s analysis.15
11 See, e.g., Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 
2019); Witkoff v. Topix, LLC, No. B257656, 2015 WL 5297912, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 
10, 2015). 
12 See, e.g., Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 722 (Wis. 2019). 
13 See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2016); 
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 420. 
14 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
15 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 
2016); O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2016); Jane Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d at 18; Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 
F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014); Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. 
v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 
F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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A simple question shows why Section 230 applies to all of 
Plaintiffs’ claims here:  
The answer is obvious: all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Facebook arise 
from messages sent across Facebook’s interactive computer service by 
the men who ultimately exploited Plaintiffs. Specifically, Plaintiffs 
claim that Facebook should have monitored such messages and 
prevented the subsequent criminal conduct. But these messages were 
all generated by third parties, not Facebook. Holding Facebook 
responsible for what third parties post treats it as the “publisher or 
speaker,” and Section 230 preempts precisely those claims. 
Negligence/failure to warn. Plaintiffs plead that Facebook owed a 
duty to warn them “of the known dangers of grooming and recruitment 
on Facebook by sex traffickers,” was negligent in failing to warn them 
through campaigns, safeguards, or procedures, and failed “to publish 
self-produced warnings” (MR050-51; MR314-15). But from where did 
this alleged duty arise, if not from messages generated by third parties 
Why does this case name Facebook as a defendant? 
13
on Facebook’s interactive computer service? Each of these negligence 
claims is based on a theory that Facebook allows users to send messages 
on its service, so therefore it must implement safeguards or publish 
warnings about how those messages could be misused. That asserts a 
standard of negligent publication—one that no interactive computer 
service could ever fully meet, and that Congress rejected. Treating 
Facebook as a publisher of those messages is barred by Section 230. 
Negligent undertaking. Plaintiffs plead that Facebook “undertook 
to warn users about and to screen for illegal conduct,” but “failed to 
exercise reasonable care” in doing so (MR053; MR315-16). Here again, 
Plaintiffs focus on Facebook because it was the medium their exploiters 
allegedly used as a platform to communicate with them. Allowing 
claims for failing to monitor content adequately would discourage 
interactive computer services from using blocking or filtering 
technologies at all unless they were guaranteed to be completely failsafe. 
That is exactly what Congress intended to prevent.16
16 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. 
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Product liability. Plaintiffs plead that Facebook was an 
unreasonably dangerous “product” because of “warning and 
marketing defects” consisting of inadequate “warnings and/or 
instructions regarding the dangers of ‘grooming’ and human 
trafficking” (MR054; MR316-17). Even if Texas law treated services as a 
“product” for tort purposes (which it does not17), Plaintiffs suffered no 
alleged harm from using Facebook until their exploiters sent online 
messages that allegedly led to Plaintiffs’ off-line harm. A suit arising 
from those actions would inherently treat Facebook as a publisher of the 
messages, contrary to the immunity provided by Section 230. 
Gross negligence. Plaintiffs plead generally that Facebook’s actions 
constituted gross negligence (MR052; MR317). But since all the 
underlying claims inherently treat Facebook as a publisher of third-
17 See Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. 1988) 
(defining “product” as a “commodity, which like other goods, can be manufactured, 
transported and sold”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (11th Ed. 2019) (“commodity 
… embraces only tangible goods.”); see also Way v. Boy Scouts of Am., 856 S.W.2d 230, 
238–39 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied) (holding alleged harmful message in 
children’s magazine could not support products liability claim against publisher). 
15
party content, Plaintiffs’ efforts to punish the same content with 
punitive damages are barred by Section 230 as well. 
The sex trafficking statute. Finally, Plaintiffs fault Facebook for 
allegedly allowing and not preventing Plaintiffs’ traffickers’ 
communications with them. They accuse Facebook of “knowingly 
facilitating the sex trafficking” of Plaintiffs by failing to publish “public 
service announcements for those who sign up for Facebook regarding 
the dangers of entrapment and grooming used by sex traffickers,” by 
not hiring experts to conduct such a campaign, by “not implementing 
safeguards” to verify users’ identity, and by “creating a breeding 
ground for sex traffickers” (MR052–53; MR313-14). Section 230 
preempts such claims because screening authors, content, and access by 
users to third-party content is what publishers traditionally do.18 The 
warnings and safeguards Plaintiffs propose relate to their traffickers’ 
third-party content, liability for which federal law declares Facebook 
18 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[L]awsuits seeking 
to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial 
functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter 
content—are barred.” (emphasis added)). 
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immune. Suing providers like Facebook for failing to warn about third-
party content would simply impose liability on them for that content. 
Federal law preempts Texas courts from rendering Section 230 useless 
like this. 
The federal circuit courts “are in general agreement that the text 
of Section 230(c)(1) should be construed broadly in favor of immunity.” 
Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d at 64 (citing opinions from the First, 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits). As the 
Fifth Circuit held in Doe v. MySpace, Inc., claims that a provider failed to 
prevent predators from contacting a minor “are merely another way of 
claiming that MySpace was liable for publishing the communications.” 
528 F.3d at 420 (emphasis added). And as the 9th, 6th, and D.C. circuits 
have stated, “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether 
to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce 
immune under section 230.”19 “No website could function if a duty of 
19 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2008), quoted with approval in Jones, 755 F.3d at 411; Klayman 
v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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care was created when a website facilitates communication, in a 
content-neutral fashion, of its users’ content.” Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1101. 
C. The trial court’s reasons for denying relief are incorrect 
In his order denying dismissal, Judge Kirkland found Facebook is 
an “interactive computer service” to which Section 230 applies; the only 
question was whether Plaintiffs’ claims “treat Facebook as the publisher 
or speaker of information provided by another” (MR204-06, MR464-66). 
Despite the clear import of the statutory text and the overwhelming 
weight of authority noted above, Judge Kirkland denied Facebook’s 
motion to dismiss because “both parties have cited cases that support 
their positions,” and Facebook’s cases did not address Plaintiffs’ failure-
to-warn claims, the Texas statutory sex trafficking statute, or the 2018 
amendments to Section 230 known as the Fight Online Sex Trafficking 
Act of 2017 (“FOSTA”)20 (MR205, MR465). But Facebook did brief these 
issues, and not one of them cancels the federal immunity provided by 
Section 230.
20 See Pub. L. No. 115-164, § 4, 132 Stat. 1253, 1254 (2018) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(e)(5)(A)). 
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Plaintiffs’ two cases. Judge Kirkland cited two cases he thought 
supported Plaintiffs’ position. Ironically, his description of one 
specifically shows why it does not: “Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733 (7th 
Cir. 2016) (ISP not immune to defamation in content it generated).”21
Plaintiffs do not allege Facebook generated any of the messages that led 
to their harm. While Section 230 does not protect information generated 
by an internet company itself, it expressly provides immunity for 
“information provided by another content provider.” Huon, 841 F.3d at 
741–42 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)) (emphasis added). That is all 
Plaintiffs allege. 
In the other case cited in the trial court’s orders, the plaintiff was 
an aspiring model who posted a profile online, and then was contacted 
off-line by two predators who lured her into a fake modeling audition 
and assaulted her. See Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 848 (9th 
Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit held Section 230 did not apply for reasons 
that do not apply here: (1) the plaintiff was not lured by anything her 
21 MR205, 465 (emphasis added). 
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assailants posted online, so the claim did not seek to hold the platform 
liable for any online third-party content;22 (2) California law imposes a 
duty to warn on persons with a “special relationship” to a potential 
victim;23 (3) her claim would not affect how the defendant published or 
monitored content;24 and (4) the defendant allegedly knew about the 
specific predators from independent outside information.25
22 Id. at 851 (“Jane Doe does not claim to have been lured by any posting that 
Internet Brands failed to remove.”); see also Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 586, 
591 (2d Cir. 2019) (“But in Internet Brands, there was no allegation that the 
defendant’s website transmitted potentially harmful content; the defendant was 
therefore not an ‘intermediary’ shielded from liability under § 230.”). Plaintiffs 
allege they were lured by online messages viewed on Facebook. 
23 Id. at 850 (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 551 P.2d 334 (1976)). Texas 
has declined to adopt this California duty to warn. See Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 
635, 638 (Tex. 1999) (declining to follow Tarasoff). 
24 Id. (“The duty to warn allegedly imposed by California law would not 
require Internet Brands to remove any user content or otherwise affect how it 
publishes or monitors such content.”). By contrast, Plaintiffs seek to impose 
substantial damages on Facebook for the way it monitors and publishes third-party 
messages. 
25 Id. at 849, 850‒51 (“[T]he case turns on whether it would be inconsistent with 
section 230(c)(1) for the State of California to require an interactive computer service 
provider to warn its users about the threat of a known sexual predator.” (emphasis 
added)). There is no allegation that Facebook at any relevant time knew the 
identities—indeed, in Jane Doe 2’s case, Facebook still does not know because 
Plaintiff has declined to identify that person.  
20
FOSTA. FOSTA amended Section 230 in several ways, none of 
which have anything to do with Plaintiffs’ claims. The 2018 
amendments (1) expanded and exempted from Section 230 a federal 
civil action for facilitating sex trafficking (which Plaintiffs have not 
alleged); and (2) exempted criminal prosecutions and state attorney 
general enforcement actions from Section 230 (which Plaintiffs could not 
allege). See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5). While the original version of the bill 
also would have exempted certain private civil actions, that proposal 
was not adopted because Congress wanted to ensure a uniform national 
standard in this area rather than a patchwork of state laws. See H.R. 
1865, 115th Cong., § 3 (a)(2)(C) (1st Sess. Apr. 3, 2017). Because FOSTA 
did not amend Section 230 in any way relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims (all 
of which are state law civil claims), it does not change the relevance of 
the hundreds of pre-2018 cases holding that Section 230 bars them.  
II. No Adequate Remedy: Mandamus Is the Remedy 
When a 91a Motion Is Improperly Denied 
“Whether a clear abuse of discretion can be adequately remedied 
by appeal depends on a careful analysis of costs and benefits of 
21
interlocutory review.” In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. 
2008); accord, In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 304 (Tex. 2016). As 
the Texas Supreme Court wrote in In re McAllen: 
Appellate courts cannot afford to grant interlocutory review 
of every claim that a trial court has made a pre-trial mistake. 
But [they] cannot afford to ignore them all either. Like 
“instant replay” review now so common in major sports, 
some calls are so important—and so likely to change a 
contest’s outcome—that the inevitable delay of interim 
review is nevertheless worth the wait. 
In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d at 461. 
A. Benefits outweigh burdens of mandamus review here 
Section 230 does not say suits contrary to its provisions cannot be 
won; it says they cannot be brought: “No cause of action may be brought
and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (emphasis added). 
Every day these cases remain pending in the trial court violates that law. 
As the Texas Supreme Court noted in McAllen, “[t]he most 
frequent use we have made of mandamus relief involves cases in which 
the very act of proceeding to trial—regardless of the outcome—would 
defeat the substantive right involved.” 275 S.W.3d at 465. For example, 
22
an appeal after a final plenary trial is not an adequate remedy if all the 
proceedings and the trial itself are improper due to an arbitration 
clause, appraisal clause, jury waiver, or forum selection clause that 
indicates they should never have taken place. Id. (listing cases).  
Relegating parties to an improper trial harms the courts as well as 
the parties: “[I]nsisting on a wasted trial simply so that it can be 
reversed and tried all over again creates the appearance not that the 
courts are doing justice, but that they don’t know what they are doing.” 
Id. at 466. 
The burdens involved in mandamus review here are minimal. 
Rule 91a dismissal is based solely on the plaintiff’s pleadings; no 
depositions, discovery responses, or other evidence can be considered. 
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. This Court is not even required to read 
Facebook’s pleadings or briefs in the trial court; a review of Plaintiffs’ 
petitions is all that is required. And as already noted, appellate review 
can be condensed to the single question: Why is Facebook a defendant 
in this suit? The answer will inevitably show that it is merely because 
Facebook is the interactive computer service on which the third parties 
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who committed these heinous crimes wrote and published their 
communications. 
A grant of mandamus would render unnecessary this Court’s 
consideration of the appeal of the special appearances. The Legislature 
requires the Texas courts of appeals to review denial of a special 
appearance by interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 51.014(a)(7). That involves a fact-intensive review. Immunity under 
Section 230 involves a narrower review of a single pleading; though the 
pleadings here are lengthy, they mostly address general background 
rather than what happened to either Plaintiff. Since the Court must 
review Facebook’s special appearances regardless, this may be the 
unusual case in which mandamus review will actually lighten the 
burden on the Court rather than increasing it.   
B. The Legislature has weighed the benefits and burdens 
Mandamus review is generally a discretionary matter. But as the 
Supreme Court stated in McAllen, “our place in a government of 
separated powers requires us to consider also the priorities of the other 
branches of Texas government.” McAllen, 275 S.W.3d at 461. In McAllen, 
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the 2003 Legislature enacted rules for medical malpractice cases that 
required early expert reports, early dismissal if not filed, and early 
review by interlocutory appeal.26 But the Legislature said nothing about 
interlocutory appeal for cases arising before enactment, and the question 
in McAllen was whether the Legislature’s silence indicated it opposed 
review by mandamus of the pending cases. 
The Supreme Court concluded it did not, because in weighing the 
costs and benefits of mandamus, “the Legislature has already balanced 
most of the relevant costs and benefits for us.” Id. at 466. “After 
extensive study, research, and hearings, the Legislature found that the 
cost of conducting plenary trials of claims as to which no supporting 
expert could be found was affecting the availability and affordability of 
health care—driving physicians from Texas and patients from medical 
care they need. Given our role among the coordinate branches of Texas 
government, we are in no position to contradict this statutory finding.” 
Id. 
26 See Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 1.03, 2003 TEX. GEN. LAWS
847, 849 (currently TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.351 & § 51.014(a)(9)-(10)). 
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The Legislature did the same thing here. In 2011, the Legislature 
ordered the Supreme Court to “adopt rules to provide for the dismissal 
of causes of action that have no basis in law or fact on motion and 
without evidence,” and set a firm 45-day deadline for action.27 Rule 91a 
was the result of that mandate. Since adoption of Rule 91a, the Texas 
Supreme Court and other Texas courts have granted mandamus relief 
when a trial court fails to dismiss a lawsuit that has no basis in law or 
fact.28 With respect to mandamus and Rule 91a: “In laying the 
groundwork for a rule mandating the early dismissal of baseless causes 
of action, the Legislature has effectively already balanced most of the 
relevant costs and benefits of an appellate remedy.”29
Of course, not all Rule 91a motions deserve mandamus review. 
From this Court’s perspective, the advantage of mandamus review is 
that the petitioner does not have a right to review or a written opinion, 
27 See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.004(g); Act of May 30, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 203, 
§ 1.01, 2011 TEX. GEN. LAWS 757, 757. 
28 See, e.g., In re Houston Specialty Ins. Co., 569 S.W.3d at 142; In re Essex Ins. Co., 
450 S.W.3d at 528; In re Wade, 566 S.W.3d 375, 385 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no 
pet.); In re Butt, 495 S.W.3d 455, 460 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, no pet.). 
29 In re Butt, 495 S.W.3d at 460. 
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as is true in interlocutory appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d). Perhaps if 
Texas courts had been more willing to grant mandamus review of 
medical malpractice cases with no expert support, or special 
appearances with no minimum contacts, or suits against citizens for 
exercising free speech, the Legislature might never have imposed the 
burden of reviewing all of them by interlocutory appeal. That the 
Legislature has not yet ordered the courts to review every denial of a 
91a motion does not mean it opposes mandamus review; “the 
Legislature’s decision to forego interlocutory review of all pending 
cases in no way suggests it intended interlocutory review of none of 
them.” McAllen, 275 S.W.3d at 466. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER 
As Congress stated in Section 230, “[i]ncreasingly Americans are 
relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, 
cultural, and entertainment services.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(5). The internet 
provides opportunities for communication, education, and commerce 
that previous generations could not have imagined. But like any other 
medium, it may be used by bad actors to harm others. In Section 230, 
27
Congress mandated that damage suits related to harmful content 
posted by other users must be brought against the authors, not the 
intermediary. Because the trial court failed to comply with that federal 
law, this Court should grant mandamus review and reverse. 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF TEXAS  § 
§ 
COUNTY OF DALLAS § 
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally 
appeared Russell Falconer, a person whose identity is known to me, and 
after being duly sworn and upon oath stated as follows: 
1. “My name is Russell H. Falconer.  I am above the age of 
twenty-one (21) years, I am fully competent to testify to the 
matters stated herein, and I have personal knowledge of the 
facts stated herein. I am one of counsel for Relator in the 
above-captioned cause. 
2. I have read Relator’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus (the 
‘Petition’). All of the factual statements in the Petition are 
within my personal knowledge obtained from review of the 
underlying record and are true and correct. 
3. Appendix 1 attached hereto is a true and correct copy of 
Order Denying Facebook’s Rule 91a Motion, dated May 23, 
2019, in Cause No. 2018-69816. 
4. Appendix 2 attached hereto is a true and correct copy of 
Order Denying Facebook’s Rule 91a Motion, dated May 23, 
2019, in Cause No. 2018-82214. 
5. Appendix 3 attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the 
text of 47 U.S.C. § 230, as provided by Westlaw®.” 





1 Order Denying Facebook’s Rule 91a Motion, dated May 23, 2019, 
in Cause No. 2018-69816 
2 Order Denying Facebook’s Rule 91a Motion, dated May 23, 2019, 
in Cause No. 2018-82214 
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United States Code Annotated
Title 47. Telecommunications (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 5. Wire or Radio Communication (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. Common Carriers (Refs & Annos)
Part I. Common Carrier Regulation
47 U.S.C.A. § 230
§ 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material
Effective: April 11, 2018
Currentness
(a) Findings
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services available to individual Americans
represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for
even greater control in the future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum
of government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment
services.
(b) Policy
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
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(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents
to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and
harassment by means of computer.
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of--
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict
access to material described in paragraph (1). 1
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the time of entering an agreement with a customer for the provision of
interactive computer service and in a manner deemed appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental control
protections (such as computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are commercially available that may assist the customer
in limiting access to material that is harmful to minors. Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer with access to
information identifying, current providers of such protections.
(e) Effect on other laws
(1) No effect on criminal law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to
obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute.
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(2) No effect on intellectual property law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.
(3) State law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section.
(4) No effect on communications privacy law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or
any of the amendments made by such Act, or any similar State law.
(5) No effect on sex trafficking law
Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or limit--
(A) any claim in a civil action brought under section 1595 of Title 18, if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a
violation of section 1591 of that title;
(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute
a violation of section 1591 of Title 18; or
(C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a
violation of section 2421A of Title 18, and promotion or facilitation of prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the
defendant's promotion or facilitation of prostitution was targeted.
(f) Definitions
As used in this section:
(1) Internet
The term “Internet” means the international computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched
data networks.
(2) Interactive computer service
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The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides
or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.
(3) Information content provider
The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.
(4) Access software provider
The term “access software provider” means a provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling tools
that do any one or more of the following:
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content.
CREDIT(S)
(June 19, 1934, c. 652, Title II, § 230, as added Pub.L. 104-104, Title V, § 509, Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 137; amended Pub.L.
105-277, Div. C, Title XIV, § 1404(a), Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-739; Pub.L. 115-164, § 4(a), Apr. 11, 2018, 132 Stat. 1254.)
Notes of Decisions (171)
Footnotes
1 So in original. Probably should be “subparagraph (A)”.
47 U.S.C.A. § 230, 47 USCA § 230
Current through P.L. 116-65.
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